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Vol. VII FEBRUARY, 1930 No. 4
THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD
COURT; REPORT OF THE ASSOCIA-
TION'S COMMITTEE
Hon. John H. Denison,
President of the Denver Bar Association.
Dear President Denison:
Your Committee on the question of whether the United
States should adhere to the Permanent Court of International
Justice, through ratification by the Senate, of the act of Presi-
dent Hoover in directing the signing at Geneva of the Proto-
col of Adherence, the Protocol of the Statute of the Court,
and the Protocol of Revision of the Statute, is now ready to
report.
The conclusion of the Committee favors the ratification.
The reasons follow:
The Permanent Court of International Justice, or, as it
is more commonly known, the World Court, was chartered
and organized in 1921, under an international Statute drafted
in 1920, and subscribed to by many States in a document called
the Protocol of Signature.
Since organization, the Court, composed of eminent
judges, has been functioning steadily, has decided sixteen in-
ternational cases, rendered sixteen advisory opinions, and has
grown rapidly in world esteem.
The Court has jurisdiction, under Article XXXVI of
the Statute,-
FIRST: Of all cases which the disputing States refer to it by special
agreement, and all matters which their general treaties and conventions like-
wise provide shall be referred.
SECOND: Of certain classes of legal disputes, the submission of
which, when arising, is agreed upon in advance at the time of subscribing to
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the Protocol of Signature (the Protocol adopting the charter Statute of the
Court), by electing to accept, although there is no obligation to elect, certain
provisions of the Protocol imposing this submission. Many of the States, by
their election, have accepted this compulsory jurisdiction,--others have not.
The United States, if adhering, would adhere as a State of this latter class.
The Court is further empowered by Article XIV of the
Covenant of the League of Nations, to render advisory opin-
ions to and at the request of either the Council or the Assembly
of the League of Nations upon any dispute or. question thus
requested, and after adopting appropriate rules, has been
exercising this advisory function, although the Protocol of
Signature has nothing to say about advisory opinions. The
Protocol for the Revision of the Statute, is designed to effect
in the Statute certain changes, among which are those supply-
ing the advisory jurisdiction lacking in the older Statute, and
also harmonizing the Statute with the Protocol of Adherence,
which is the principal international agreement by which, if
ratified by the Senate, the United States would enter the Court.
In view of the fact that for the time being at any rate,
the United States has adopted the policy of co-operation with,
rather than membership in, the League of Nations, the wisdom
of adherence by this country to the World Court would seem
to depend upon two questions:
(1) Whether the other States which are members of the Court have
now complied with the reserved conditions upon which if accepted by the
other members of the Court, our Senate declared in 1926 that it would be
willing to see the United States adhere.
(2) Upon whether there is anything in the adherence to the Court,
which, either through the Protocol of Adherence, or through the Covenant
of the League of Nations, would subject the United States to the League.
SENATE RESERVATIONS
These famous reservations are five in number:
The first reservation is to the effect that the adherence of
the United States to the Court shall not involve -any legal
relation to the League of Nations, or the assumption of any
obligations by the United States under the treaty of Versailles.
While this reservation is not accepted by the Protocol of
Adherence in specific language, it is accepted in the general
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language of the Introduction and of Article I, relating to all
five of the reservations.
The second reservation demands a right of participation
by the United States in the election of the Judges who com-
prise the Court, these Judges now being elected by a con-
curring majority of the Council and of the Assembly of the
League, voting separately. This demand is met specifically
by Article II of the Protocol of Adherence, and under it the
United States, although not a member of the League, would,
for the purpose of electing Judges, have the same right to
vote as if a member.
The third reservation contemplates that the determina-
tion of what share of the expenses of the Court should be borne
by the United States shall be made by the Congress of the
United States itself. Compliance with this reservation is to
be found in the general language of acceptance in the Intro-
duction of the Protocol of Adherence and in Article I.
In the fourth reservation the Senate stipulates that the
United States be permitted at any time to withdraw its adher-
ence to the Court, and that the charter Statute under which
the Court was created, shall not be amended without the con-
sent of the United States. The right of withdrawal is com-
pletely provided for in Article VIII of the Protocol of Ad-
herence and the right to veto any amendment of the charter
Statute is fully conceded by Article III.
The fifth reservation is the one which has given the most
trouble. This reservation is to the effect that,-( 1) the Court
shall not render advisory opinions except publicly, after no-
tice to all States belonging to the Court, and after public
hearings or opportunity for public hearings is given to all
States concerned, and also, that,-(2) the Court shall not,
without the consent of the United States, entertain any re-
quest for an advisory opinion touching any dispute or ques-
tion in which the United States has, or claims an interest.
Under the present governing laws of the Court, advisory
opinions may be called for only by the Council or by the As-
sembly of the League of Nations, and not by individual
States. The Court has rendered sixteen. such opinions al-
ready. They are considered of great value to the States
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belonging to the Court. They tend, among other things, to
avert a crisis between States before it becomes acute. While
advisory opinions, being advisory, are not binding, they never-
theless, carry great moral weight. To provide for the desired
publicity has been easy enough, but to find a formula that
would satisfy the United States in its desire to possess a veto
power to prevent rendition of an advisory opinion on any
matter in which the United States might have or claim an
interest and at the same time not destroy wholly this useful
function of the Court for the remaining States which do not
ask for any similar veto power, has been a difficult problem.
Article IV of the Protocol of Adherence complies with
the publicity demand by providing irrevocably what the rules
of the Court already provided revocably, namely, that ad-
visory opinions shall be rendered only in public session of
the Court after notice and after opportunity to be heard pub-
licly.
Article V of the Protocol goes even further in respect to
the right of the United States to be heard as to advisory opin-
ions than demanded by the Senate itself, for this Article pro-
vides that even before a request is made upon the Court for
an advisory opinion, and while the proposed request is still
pending in the Council or Assembly of the League, notice shall
be given to the United States so that there may be an exchange
of views between the United States and the Council or As-
sembly as the case may be, on the question of whether or not
an interest of the United States would be affected by an ad-
visory opinion on the subject matter of the proposed request.
In respect to the desire for a veto power, it may be said
that most questions for which an advisory opinion would be-
sought probably would be questions in which the United
States neither would have nor claim an interest. This has
been true as to all sixteen of the advisory opinions thus far
rendered. Again, if by chance the question involved in the
proposed advisory opinion should happen, to be one in which
the United States has or claims an interest, the Government
might be perfectly willing to have an advisory opinion ren-
dered upon it, and even might join in the request. If, how-
ever, it should turn out that the United Stites not only has
or claims to have an interest, but persists in its insistence that
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no opinion should be rendered, then, as provided under Article
V of the Protocol, the United States could exercise its ex-
pressly reserved power of withdrawal from the Court "with-
out any imputation of unfriendliness or unwillingness to co-
operate generally for peace and good will." Thus the formu-
la by which the Protocol solves the problems of the fifth reser-
vation is of such a nature that the Court could not, while the
United States is a member of it, render an advisory opinion
on any subject matter in which the United States either has
or claims to have an interest. True, the Court could entertain
the request and render the opinion after the United States
had withdrawn. But to do this, in other words, for the Court
to render an advisory opinion while the United States is not
a member is, however, a function the Court is exercising al-
ready. Manifestly, then, the United States no more subjects
itself to the influence of the advisory opinions by joining the
Court than by remaining outside. Indeed, under member-
ship, the subjection would be actually less, because member-
ship in itself carries a greater opportunity of control to the
State possessing it. Then, too, the universal desire to have
the United States become a member of the Court may be de-
pended upon, in the event we should join, to induce, in all
probability, the other States not to press for an advisory opin-
ion which the United States really would not want rendered.
In the Senate's Resolution of Adherence, and following
the recital of the five reservations are a couple of "under-
standings" with which also it would be contemplated that the
United States would be joining the Court. According to the
first of these, recourse to the Court for the settlement of a
difference between the United States and any other State, is
to be had only through general or special treaties concluded
between the parties in dispute. This is provided for already
in the charter Statute of the Court. No State, on signing the
Protocol of Signature, need subscribe to the Court's compul-
sory jurisdiction unless it wants to, although many States have
done so. The United States contemplates subscribing only to
the Court's voluntary jurisdiction, that is, the jurisdiction
assented to voluntarily by the parties themselves through gen-
eral or special treaty or agreement aside from that represented
by any of the Protocols under consideration.
DICTA
The other "understanding" which the Senate prescribed,
was to the effect that adherence to the Court should not be
construed as requiring the United States to depart from its
traditional policy of not interfering with, or entangling itself
in, the political questions of policy or internal administration
of other States, or as implying a relinquishment by the United
States of its traditional attitude toward purely American
questions. There is nothing in the Protocol of Adherence
implying in the slightest degree a departure either from the
policy or the attitude mentioned, since under the Protocol the
United States could not be obliged to submit to the Court
any dispute with another State unless electing to do so, and
since it could veto the rendition even of an advisory opinion
while a member of the Court.
THE COURT AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
Since the present policy of the United States is to cooper-
ate voluntarily with the League rather than to be a member,
it becomes important to inquire whether acceptance by the
United States of membership in the Court would carry with
it an agreement to be bound by the provisions of the Covenant
of the League of Nations or would otherwise create a subjec-
tion of the United States to the League.
We have considered this inquiry and answer it in the
negative.
While it was the League of Nations that under Article
14 of the Covenant brought about the organization of the
Court, it was not the League that chartered it or gave it the
breath of life. Both charter and life came directly from the
many States which, while members of the League, neverthe-
less, acting apart from the League, separately and independ-
ently adopted the charter Statute and by so doing brought
the Court into being.
The Court and the League are different entities or or-
ganizations. The decisions of the Court are not subject to
the control of the League. Membership in the Court is not
membership in the League or an acceptance of the provisions
of the Covenant.
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The relation between the Court and the League is, how-
ever, a close one. The common purpose of promoting inter-
national peace, together with the large degree of identity in
membership, make it so. Fifty-four states are members of
the League and fifty-two of them have signed the Protocol
of Signature (the Charter Statute) of the Court and thirty-
two of these have ratified it. There are now only two states
belonging to the Court which do not belong to the League.
The relation between Court and League is not one, however,
which need deter the United States in the slightest degree
from entering the Court.
The judges of the Court are elected by the Council and
the Assembly of the League, and their salaries are a part of
the budget of the League collected from the League's mem-
ber States, but the United States, under the Protocol of Ad-
herence, is to have in the election a voice equal to that of any
other State and is to determine the amount of its own contri-
bution to the expenses of the Court's maintenance.
We have noted already that the Council or Assembly may
call for advisory opinions from the Court, although under
the Protocol of Adherence the United States would have a
veto power against the rendition of these opinions as long as
the United States is a member of the Court.
In the examination of the relation between the Court and
the League we now come to the subject of "sanctions", that is
to those inducements which lead the States, when litigants
before the Court, to abide by the Court's decree.
In the domestic or national courts of individual States
the usual "sanction" or inducement for exacting obedience
to the judgment of a court, is force-the force of the marshal
or sheriff and his agents, or corresponding officers.
The only "sanction" found in the Protocols themselves
by which to exact submission to the decree of the World Court
is the moral obligation and the honor of the litigant State,
whether a member of the League or not, which has submitted
its case under an agreement to abide by the result. True, there
is always the public opinion of the World-another powerful
"sanction", but this lies outside of any agreement.
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Although the Protocols contain no language calling for
any "sanction" other than that of moral obligation yet, as to
member States of the League it is clear that under Articles
13 and 16 of the League Covenant the members of the League
contemplate the possible use of economic and even military
"sanctions" under certain circumstances against one of their
own number refusing to abide by the decision of the Court.
As to States which are not members of the League but are
members of the Court, it is equally clear that no legal con-
nection between the Court Protocols and the Covenant of the
League would make any "sanction" of economic pressure or
physical force applicable to the United States should the lat-
ter, upon adhering to the Court refuse to comply with a de-
cision in a matter voluntarily submitted. This does not mean
that the member States of the League have not, by Article 17
of the Covenant, agreed in such wise as to contemplate the
possible use of economic and even military pressure against
a non-member of the League which, on invitation of the
Council, either refuses to submit a controversy to the Court or,
having submitted it, refuses to abide by the decision but does
the wholly unlikely thing of resorting to war instead; for there
is an agreement among the League States to that effect. But
it does mean, that the United States no more becomes a party
to that agreement contained in the Covenant, no more assumes
an obligation in respect thereto and no more subjects itself to
the League by adhering to the Court under the Protocols be-
fore us, than by not adhering at all.
WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD JOIN THE COURT
Since under the Protocol of Signature creating the Court,
the United States, although not a party to that Protocol, is
already eligible as a suitor or defendant before the Court,
the question of why the United States should become a mem-
ber is a fair one. Consideration proves that eligibility is not
enough; that there should be actual membership.
The reasons for membership are two. The Court needs
the United States. The United States, from the standpoint
of enlightened self-interest, needs the Court. The process of
diverting the thought and habit of the Nations from war to a
judicial tribunal, as an agency for the settlement of interna-
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tional conflict, is a slow one at best. The adherence of the
United States means everything to. the increasing strength and
prestige of the Court and to its acceptance by all Nations as
an agency for peace. As for the self-interest of the United
States we are more likely, as a matter of human nature, to
receive exact justice from the Court, as a litigant before it,
if we appear as a member under the Protocols than if as a
foreigner under the privilege of eligibility, no matter how
graciously extended. Then too, international experience
proves that wars come not only to the original disputants but
also, as in the case of our own nation in the World War, to
neutrals whose rights the original disputants violate. The
World Court advanced in power and influence by our own
membership in it, would have a strong tendency to minimize
the frequency of the wars in which our country would be
engaged, and, therefore, to increase the security of the life,
opportunities and achievements of our people.
RECOMMENDATIONS
For these reasons and in conclusion, the committee re-
spectfully recommends to the Denver Bar Association the
adoption of the attached Resolution for the adherence of the






L. WARD BANNISTER, Chairman.
RESOLUTION OF THE DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION
RELATING TO THE WORLD COURT
WHEREAS, the representative of the United States at
Berne, acting under the direction of the President of the
United States, has signed the Protocol of Signature of the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the
Protocol of Adherence of the United States to said Protocol
of Signature, and also has signed the Protocol of Revision of
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the Statute referred to, all to the end that the United States
may become a member of said Court, and
WHEREAS, the Permanent Court of International Justice,
or World Court as it is more commonly called, is a great con-
structive agency for the maintenance of international peace,
needs increasing support from the public opinion of the World
and is needed in turn not only by other Nations but, from the
standpoint of enlightened self-interest, by our own Nation as
well, and
WHEREAS, the United States may now safely become a
member of said Court under the Protocols referred to without
either sacrifice of sovereignty or violation of traditional poli-
cies in international affairs,
Now, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the Denver Bar
Association earnestly favors the ratification of these Protocols
by the Senate of the United States; that a copy of this Resolu-
tion, together with a copy of the report of the committee of
the Association, which is hereby approved, be sent to the Sena-
tors representing Colorado at Washington and that a copy of
the Resolution be sent to the President of the United States.*
*EIrroR's NoTm: After due consideration the above report of the committee was
approved and accepted by the Association and the resolution adopted as recommended.
